Abstract -After a fatal explosion on a Cypriot naval base, aerial robots were requested and deployed to assist in the assessment of the situation. The explosion had caused fatalities and severely damaged a nearby power plant which had contributed nearly half of the electrical power of the island. Enduring danger of collapse and falling debris interdicted access by humans to most parts of this critical infrastructure. Hence, aerial robots were used to conduct low altitude aerial assessment of roofs, load-bearing primary structures and other inaccessible parts. Assessment flights were carried out in a series of rapid iterations with disaster experts, structural and electrical engineers who specified flight objectives. This paper gives an account of this aerial robotic assessment mission with a focus on operational aspects and lessons learned.
I. INTRODUCTION
Assessment missions in disaster management and robots are a natural match. Such missions inherently involve the need for obtaining data from areas that are difficult and often dangerous to access. Compared to human assessment experts, robots are expendable. Moreover, their various modes of mobility, such as flying above or crawling through debris, let them reach locations inaccessible to humans. Disaster management motivates research, not only in robotics but also in related fields such as communications or remote sensing [15] . Topics range from sensor networks [8] to autonomous exploration [13] , 2D mapping [7] and 3D modeling [16] . Yet, these technologies are still fledgling in this application domain. Initiatives like RoboCup Rescue [6] or the DARPA Robotics Challenge (DRC) [14] aim for realistic scenarios and environments and are important platforms to conceive, test and benchmark robotic technology towards field-readiness in disaster-response operations. We believe that such challenges in combination with careful deployments, that study existing and evolving operational procedures and field conditions, are important steps towards valuable and reliable robotic systems in the field. Our own research on aerial robots and disaster management has given us the opportunity to participate in the European Civil Protection Mission to Cyprus in response to a fatal explosion of ammunition. It is our hope that by sharing our experiences from this mission and pointing out unsolved problems, we will serve towards expediting the use of robots as a valuable and regular tool in disaster management operations. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We briefly review related work in Section II. Section III describes the mission on Cyprus, starting with an overview of the disaster and the initial response, including deployed robots (III-A), team composition (III-B) and experiences in operating the robots on-site (III-C). Based on this background, we derive findings and lessons learned in Section IV, including suggestions on improved crew roles (IV-A), safety concerns and measures (IV-B), the orchestration of sensors (IV-C) and some technological gaps (IV-D). Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several robotic rescue and assessment missions have been reported. In 2005 aerial robots were deployed after Hurricane Katrina. The remote controlled helicopter iSENSYS IP-3 was equipped with a pan-tilt camera and was used for aerial assessment during the response and recovery phases [10] . Also in 2005, the cooperative use of this micro aerial vehicle (MAV) and an unmanned sea surface vehicle (USV) in response to Hurricane Wilma is documented by Murphy et al. in [11] . In 2007 the same type of helicopter was deployed in Jacksonville, Florida after the collapse of the Berkman Plaza II building. A difficulty during this mission was that regulatory issues forced the MAV to be tethered to the ground. As a result the cognitive load for the pilot increased, and compared to prior deployments the overall team composition was extended [12] . Honeywell T-Hawk hovering MAVs were deployed to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan 2011. These tele-operated MAVs were used to assess reactor buildings from an aerial perspective [5] . In late July 2012, a quadrotor MAV supported damage assessment of churches after earthquakes in Italy's Emilia-Romagna region in May and June 2012 [3] .
III. ASSESSMENT MISSION CYPRUS 2011
On July 11th, 2011 a fatal explosion of ammunition on the Cypriot "Evangelos Florakis" naval base caused 13 fatalities and injured more than 60 persons. The nearby Vasilikos Power Plant (VPP), which contributed nearly half of the electrical power of the Republic of Cyprus, was severely damaged, resulting in an immediate shutdown. Two days later the Cypriot government requested assistance through the European Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCP), to assist in assessing the situation. On July 16th, an EUCP team, consisting of disaster experts, structural and electrical engineers from eight European countries, was deployed to Cyprus [2] . DLR's Center for Satellite Based Crisis Information (ZKI) provided a satellite map of the affected area. This map (see Fig. 2) shows the situation at VPP after the explosion. The red rectangles on the left highlight the explosion crater, orange circles mark the distance to the source of the explosion. The rectangles on the right magnify the roofs of the turbine halls 1 to 3 and the corresponding boiler towers. In the northern part of the power plant, damages of the oil tanks are visible. Damages of smaller structures, like three smaller diesel tanks south of the large oil tanks which were also hit by shrapnel cannot be identified on the satellite map. As most of the power plant's structures were inaccessible due to enduring danger of collapse and falling debris, Cyprus issued an additional request for technical experts with equipment to conduct low altitude aerial assessment of roofs, load-bearing primary structures and other unaccessible parts of the power plant. In response to this request the authors of this paper were deployed to Cyprus on July, 22nd and joined the EUCP team. In a series of rapid iterations with structural and electrical engineers several assessment flights on site were carried out on July, 26th, constituting the first time MAVs have been utilized in a European Civil Protection Mechanism mission [4] . 
A. Robotic Platforms and Technical Setup
Two platforms were used for the aerial assessment, an AscTec Falcon and an AscTec Hummingbird. They differ in size, layout, number of rotors and payload capacity. Both systems are remote controlled by a pilot. GPS, pressure and inertial sensors support the pilot and provide attitude and position stability in most outdoor situations.
(a) Falcon MAV and remote control with display. The AscTec Falcon octocopter (see Fig. 3 (a)) has eight electrically powered rotors, 500 g payload (a total weight of 1920 g), dimensions of about 800x850x160 mm, and an approximate flight time of 15 minutes. It is equipped with a Sony NEX-5 camera (14MP image and Full HD video resolution) on a stabilized camera frame. A display on the remote control shows the live view of the camera (see Fig. 3(b) ). Both camera and platform can be controlled by the pilot, the camera can alternatively be operated by a second person. This payload operator can observe the camera output on a separate display and control the camera using a joystick. The pilot can always override these external control commands. For assessment in confined areas a quadrotor of type AscTec Humminbird was used, for its more compact dimensions (540x540x90 mm). This quadrotor is also electrically powered, can carry 200 g payload (total weight of 680 g), and has an approximate flight time of 15 minutes. A digital camera with a resolution of 5 MP was attached to the bottom of the quadrotor. This camera was configured to constantly take images at a rate of 1 Hz. Additionally, a live video feed was transmitted. In both cases, the video feed was used by the pilot for controlling the robot (see Fig. 3(b) ). In case of the Octocopter, it was used in parallel by the payload operator to control the camera tilt and pan. Experts followed the video feed on a separate display for immediate feedback on the flight plan. As the same camera was used for control and data acquisition, its output was processed in two ways: 1) High resolution video/imagery was stored directly on board the MAV and evaluated on ground between flights. 2) Reduced quality video was transmitted via analog radio to the ground station and could also be received on a separate terminal.
B. Team Composition
The MAV team was tightly integrated with the rest of the EUCP team in all aspects, such as safety and security and logistics. The core MAV team consisted of three persons: During flights the flight director monitored the airspace to ensure safe operations for all team members, other aircraft such as helicopters and the MAV. The payload operator was controlling the camera, and the pilot could concentrate on controlling the MAV. In Fig. 4 (b) the pilot is seen on the left controlling the MAV with the remote control. The payload operator is sitting on the box watching the live video and controlling the camera with a joystick, whereas structural experts point out relevant objects and desired view angles (see Fig. 4(a) ). During flight breaks the pilot reviewed the previous flight's data with the team and planned the next flights. The payload operator checked the hardware and replaced batteries, whereas the flight director stored all collected data and maintained the logbook.
C. Operations
All assessments flights were carried out on July 26th, 2011. During the first flights in the morning disaster relief experts and structural engineers were involved in situ to define the areas of interest and adapt the flight plan according to the needs. The bulk of information demand on the aerial robots originated from experts responsible for structural assessment. Three hot spots were identified:
• The turbine hall of unit 1, whose front wall had faced the source of the explosion and was directly struck by the shock wave (see Figs. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c)).
• The boiler of unit 1, one of the tallest buildings in the area, which was also severely damaged.
• The control rooms of unit 4, which were not human accessible at the time of the assessment. A total of 10 assessment flights were performed. During these flights video, images, GPS tracks and field notes were collected (see Table I ). No position logs are available for the flights of the Hummingbird quadrotor, as these had been the ones conducted in between the high structures of unit 4, resulting in insufficient GPS coverage. We were able to provide detailed visual data of the beams at the top of boiler unit 1, which were visible from the side (see Fig. 7(b) ). In addition, imagery of the boiler roof provided new insights about the explosion propagation. As there was a series of explosions and the deformations of roof crossbars are inwards (see Fig. 7(a) ), it is speculated that the lower ammunitions containers shot up the stacked containers, which subsequently exploded in the air.
IV. ROBOTICS-RELATED FINDINGS & LESSONS LEARNED
Work at disaster scenes brings special demands for humans, robots and procedures. Environmental conditions in general and special conditions at the disaster site influence the operations. Relevant aspects are in particular safety and security, reliability, mobility and time constraints which result in physical and mental stress. The nature of emergency situations inherently denies detailed preplanning. Hence, some degree of over-provisioning and technical margin is desirable to facilitate adaptation to the situation. It is advantageous to bring aerial robots as early as possible into the mission. Descriptions of robots and operational procedures should be prepared in advance for stakeholders, such as site owners, insurance companies etc. to speed up the process. This includes also documents like insurance certificates. In our case concerns by the insurance companies of the power-plant were the main source of delay. The reasons for these concerns were remaining ammunition which was distributed on the area and leaking oil tanks. Both highly increased the risk of fire and limited the safe area for the flights significantly.
The weather with high summer temperatures and bright sunlight was demanding for the entire team and especially for the MAV pilot. As also wind speeds were changing during the day, the best times for actual flying operations was in the morning and in the evening. One specific risk on the site was debris falling and moreover sheet metal "sailing" down from the buildings. This required the pilot to stay at significant distance to the assessed structures. This distance is problematic, due to the limited depth perception of human operators. We mitigated this problem by adding a perpendicular perspective, i.e., another person placed on a line of sight right angled to the pilot-vehicle axis, connected to the pilot with radio communication and giving depth information while surveying the safety distance to obstacles. A combination of a) the aforementioned limited depth perception, b) insufficient indoor GPS reception and accuracy and c) a jungle of ruptured cables and pipes that dangled from ceilings made indoor flying impossible. Relevant to our own research is also that the interest of the disaster relief experts was not uniformly distributed over the environment but focussed around hotspots. Hence, close in-situ interaction with assessment experts during flights, for real-time definition of areas of interests and data review directly after landing for adjusting of flight plans is paramount. Ideally, this definition would occur based on an overview of the area obtained from autonomous robotic exploration. Today, the limited time slots for flying on site make it infeasible to perform a complete exploration of the environment with a single MAV. In the future, multi-agent based autonomous exploration may facilitate such overviews in very little time.
A. Crew Roles and Tasks
The team composition we described in III-B correlates with the crew roles described by Murphy et al. [10] . Additionally, we off-loaded maintenance tasks from the pilot to the payload operator (mission specialist), as the pilot was strongly involved in discussions during flight-breaks for planning the next flight. Murphy suggests that the pilot is physically assisted by another person (flight director) while he is concentrating on controlling the vehicle and maintaining line of sight. We second this approach for most situations. In our case, the pilot was very exposed to a constant danger of stumbling and falling over debris on the ground. Hence, we limited the pilot's movement to a small cleared zone. We located the assisting person some distance away from pilot and camera operator, to obtain a better angle for observing airspace, team and MAV and give advice to the other team members. The limitations on the pilot's movement can result in the need for stopovers and additional flights. To ensure the communication between flight director, pilot and payload operator in spite of surrounding noise, each team member was equipped with a radio terminal and headset. We propose to extend crew roles towards non-operational responsibilities. Already before entering the affected area, the flight director is responsible for liaison with other stakeholders and develops a draft schedule. To enable the other team members to concentrate on on-site operations, distinct logistics have to be organized by the flight director: accommodation, transportation of the equipment to the disaster area, water and food on site, etc. The payload operator's non-operational responsibilities are the maintenance of the equipment, especially to assure that batteries are charged, and the team safety and security. From our experience the pilot should make use of the off-site time for recuperation, as the most exhausting role during the operations is controlling the platform. The MAV crew roles are summarized in Table II. A crew role is not necessarily bound to a single person. Ideally, each team member can perform each role, so another team member can take over, if e.g. the pilot is exhausted. To ensure seamless handover from one role to another, the team members need to be cross-trained in using the equipment and know how to work in disaster situations. Ideally the team members know each other and have worked together before. Additionally, informal team communication about all relevant information is essential.
B. Safety Concerns and Measures
Before and during assessment flights several safety concerns and inherent risks need to be considered and balanced against the potential information gain and its value to support disaster management.
1) Sources and effects of malfunction:
Compared to fixed wing MAVs or helicopters with auto-rotation, the specific design of hovering MAVs based on the multicopter design provides only very limited redundancy of critical components. Hence, mechanical or electrical failures, such as the breaking of a propeller or loosening of an electrical connection due to vibration are likely to cause the MAV to rapidly loose thrust and height, usually leading to ground impact. While an MAV's trajectory and impact zone after loss of thrust is fairly predictable, radio interference (e.g. from a nearby radio station) or software bugs may lead to a partial or complete loss of control. In consequence, the trajectory the MAV may travel is only limited by its dynamics, such as maximum velocity or climbing rate and the remaining energy in its batteries at the time control is lost. Sensor input which is used to estimate the state of an MAV is critical for flight performance. The loss of positioning information, such as GPS signals due to blocking and multi-path, is likely and particularly severe in dense environments. Furthermore, interference can be a cause for loosing position.
Any of the failures mentioned above may lead to damage or loss of an MAV. Depending on the environment, retrieval may not be possible. Typical situations are when the MAV has landed in a zone that is not human accessible due to safety concerns or when the MAV falls into water. While the loss of an MAV is certainly not desirable from an economic standpoint, it may be particularly severe from an operational standpoint when happening in an early phase of a mission and no replacement is available, thereby potentially leading to a complete mission failure. Even in the absence of any malfunctioning and a successful mission, significant costs may be incurred if an MAV is contaminated by radiological or explosive substances. This contamination may range from being a nuisance, e.g. by setting off detectors during security checks at airports or be actually dangerous.
Due to the inherently small mass of MAVs the primary mechanical damage caused to the environment is relatively limited. Unfortunately, dangerous situations may occur in situations where an MAVs impact causes secondary effects such as interfering with road traffic or igniting flammable material, either by sparks or a rapid release of the electrochemical energy stored in the MAVs Lithium-Polymer batteries. During the Cyprus mission this was a particularly relevant concern, due the large amount of fuel in the partially ruptured fuel tanks and a fire fighting system that was damaged by the explosion. Flying platforms, especially when operating in low altitude, always include a potential risk for the operators or spectators in the proximity. A prominent example is the fatal accident in Incheon, South Korea, on 10 May 2012, when a UAV crashed (potentially due to loss of GPS), killing one engineer and injuring two remote pilots [9] .
2) Measures: Preflight assessment of the operational area is of great benefit and familiarizes the pilot and the entire team with the environment they will be operating in. The assessment should emphasize safety issues and should be used to define take-off and landing zones, fly zones, areas of interest and an initial flight plan. No-fly zones, such as areas with explosive dangers need to be defined and clearly communicated. Emergency landing zones and contingency plans should be defined to give the pilot an exit in uncomfortable or emergency situations. Nevertheless, the pilot should always be able to refuse flying if he or she is uncomfortable with the situation. Especially in industrial complexes close coordination with involved insurance companies is essential. Legal issues have to be clarified. In international missions this may take significant amounts of time.
C. Orchestration of Sensors
Ideally, all information sources are orchestrated and each required information is obtained by using the most economic sensor (many factors, including time or involved risk may be considered as "cost" of using a sensor) that can deliver it. This principle helps to free sensors with unique capabilities for tasks that only they can perform. An example would be to use a hand-held camera with a telephoto lens to take images from perspectives a human can safely access, maybe using a turntable ladder or a lifting platform, thereby freeing the capacity of an MAV for taking images from more dangerous vantage points or greater heights that are otherwise hard to obtain. Decision makers need good working knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and cost of the various sensors. Since decision makers are not necessarily of technical background, these properties need to be described in a concise and understandable way. Fortunately, experts are becoming increasingly familiar with satellite-, aircraft-and MAV-based remote sensing and mapping. The initial phase right after the explosion in Cyprus may serve as an illustration of this orchestration. Upon early indications of the severeness of the explosion, a satellite was tasked to acquire first postdisaster imagery. In parallel a manned aircraft with remote sensing cameras was readied for obtaining imagery with higher resolution. The assessment team decided based on the satellite image that the additional benefit of higher resolution imagery did not justify the high cost of transferring the aircraft to Cyprus. Instead, it was decided to request support by MAVs, since, in contrast to the manned aircraft, these would provide images from the sides and inside of structures.
D. Technological Gaps and Potential
State of the art technology already is able to support disaster missions. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. Further automation provides huge potential to improve efficiency and reduce the load for operators. Highly autonomous flying vehicles are already broadly used in high altitude operations, such as surveillance missions, where obstacles are rare. However, this is still a challenge for operations in close urban or indoor environments, where the reliability of sensing and mapping the environment, communication and flight dynamics is still insufficient. A promising approach for stable positioning without GPS has recently been shown using visual navigation by Weiss et al. [17] . Increased temporal and spatial resolution and availability of sensors through redundancy may be obtained when multi-agent systems are utilized. Therefore, part of our research focusses on multi-agent systems for future missions. Robust communication and coordination algorithms as well as human-robotics interfaces with a focus on multi-agent systems are needed for this aim. In future missions this will allow to simultaneously operate a number of agents in 3D-space, while maintaining continuous situation awareness of the state of the agents and the environment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides an account of the first MAV deployment within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. We have described the situation on site, the technical setup, team composition and outcome of our mission. Based on the gathered experience, we derived suggestions for in-situ operations, with a focus on aerial assessment missions. These include operating procedures, safety measures and future research needs. The use of Micro Aerial Vehicles for disaster management missions is still uncommon and their operational impact needs to be evaluated in more detail and improved were necessary. While aerial robots can provide a fast overview and details of a disaster environment, the additional equipment and operators introduce additional complexity and logistic burden. In order to justify their presence on the scene, the information and safety gained by their use must be worth these costs. Towards this objective, disaster experts and robotic scientists and engineers need to continue to accrue good working knowledge of each others' domains and capabilities in order to unbiasedly judge when, where and which robot to deploy.
